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doctrine by establishing that containers and compartments could be
included in a warrantless search of
an automobile, provided the search
was supported by probable cause.
Acevedo, 111 S. Ct. at 1986. Ross,
however, distinguished the Carroll
doctrine from the separate rule governing searches ofclosed containers
established in Chadwick and Sanders. Id.
In both Chadwick and Sanders, police conducted a warrantless
search of luggage which was being
transported in an automobile. AIthough police had probable cause to
suspect the luggage, they did not
have probable cause to suspect that
the vehicles were carrying contraband. Id. at 1986-87. Inbothcases,
the Court refused to extend the
Carroll doctrine to include the warrant less search of luggage merely
because it happened to be transported in an automobile. Id. at
1987. The Court emphasized the
heightened privacy interest a person
expects in his or her luggage and
personal effects, and concluded that
this interest was not diminished by
the presence of such items in a vehicle. Id. at 1986-87.
In overruling the ChadwickSanders rule, the Court reasoned
that the rule afforded minimum privacy protection to individuals and
impeded effective law enforcement.
Id. at 1989. The Court recognized
that "a container found after a general search ofthe automobile and a
container found in a car after a limited search for the container are
equally easy for the police to store
and for the suspect to hide or destroy." Id. at 1988. The Court noted
that under New York v. Belton,
453 U.S. 454 (1981), law enforcement officers could not only seize a
container and hold it until a warrant
was obtained, but could also search
containers without a warrant as a
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search incident to a lawful arrest.
Acevedo, 111 S. Ct. at 1988. Because the Chadwick-Sanders rule
did not substantially serve privacy
interests, the Court held that separate treatment for an automobile
search extending only to a container
within the vehicle was no longer
required under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 1989.
The Court further reasoned that
the Chadwick-Sanders rule had
"confusedcourtsandpoliceofficers
and impeded effective law enforcement." Id. It was not always clear
whether there was probable cause to
search a package or an entire vehicle. Id. at 1989-90. For example,
if an officer had probable cause to
believe that an automobile contained
drugs, began to search the vehicle
and immediately discovered a package of drugs, arguably either rule
could apply. Id.
This confusion was further demonstrated by the factthat since 1982,
state courts and federal courts of
appeals had been reversed in their
Fourth Amendment holdings
twenty-nine times. Id. at 1990.
Because ofthis confusion, the Court
concluded that it was better''to adopt
one clear-cut rule to govern automobile searches and eliminate the
warrant requirement for closed containers set forth in Sanders . . . .
The interpretation of the Carroll
doctrine set forth in Ross now applies to all searches of containers
found in an automobile." Id. at
1991. Thus, police may conduct a
warrantless search ofan automobile
or any container in the automobile
as long as the search is supported by
probable cause. Id.
By its decision in Acevedo, the
Supreme Court simplified the confusing law surrounding the automobile exception to the warrant clause
of the Fourth Amendment. While
this may lead to more effective law

enforcement, the privacy interests
of the individual may have been
compromised. The fact that privacy
rights in personal effects are lost
immediately as one enters a moving
vehicle may lead to an abuse of
police power and less protection for
the individual.
- Kim-Haylee Loewenstein Band

Florida v. Bostick: POLICE
OFFICERS MAY BOARD BUS
AND RANDOMLY ASK
PASSENGERS FOR CONSENT TO SEARCH LUGGAGE WITHOUT NECESSARILY VIOLATING
FOURTH AMENDMENT.
In Florida v. Bostick, 111 S. Ct.
2382 (1991), the Supreme Court
decided that a seizure did not automatically occur when police officers boarded buses and asked passengers for consent to search their luggage. The Court stated that while
the Fourth Amendment does prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures, it does not prohibit voluntary
co-operation.
During a stopover in Ft. Lauderdale, two police officers boarded a
bus and, without reasonable suspicion, requested permission to search
the defendant's (Bostick) luggage.
The police officers did not use
threats, and Bostick was explicitly
told that he had the right to refuse
consent. Bostick consented to the
search which led police to find cocaine in his luggage.
Bostick argued that a seizure took
place when police officers boarded
the bus and asked for consent to
search his luggage. Bostick moved
to suppress the evidence on the basis that it was improperly seized in
violation of his Fourth Amendment
rights. The Florida District Court of
Appeal affirmed the trial court's
denial of Bostick's motion, but certified the question of seizure to the

Florida Supreme Court. B e c au s e
the encounter took place in the
cramped confines of a bus, Bostick
argued that the police presence was
much more intimidating than it
would be in another setting. Bostick,
111 S. Ct. at 2386. Reversing the
lower courts' decision, the Florida
Supreme Court held that a seizure
resulted when the police officers
randomly boarded the bus and without articulable suspicion, asked for
the passengers' consent to search
their luggage. Id. at 2385 (citing
554So.2dat1154(Fla.1989». The
court reasoned that a seizure occurred because a reasonable passenger "would not have felt free to
leave the bus to avoid questioning
by the police." Id. The court thus
adopted a perse rule that bus searches
were unconstitutional. The United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether the Florida
per se rule was compatible with
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
In addressing the issue ofwhether
a police encounter of this nature
constituted a "seizure" within the
Fourth Amendment, the Supreme
Court outlined established case law
which demonstrated that "a seizure
does not occur simply because a
police officer approaches an individual and asks a few questions."
Bostick, 111 S. Ct. at 2386. The
Court stated that "[s]o long as a
reasonable person would feel free
'to disregard the police and go about
his business,' the encounter is consensual and no reasonable suspicion
is required." Id. (citing California
v. HodariD., 111 S. Ct. 1547, 1551
(1991».
The Court then rejected Bostick's
claim that his case was different
because it took place in the cramped
quarters of a bus. The Court reasoned that Bostick's movements
were confined not because police
conduct was "coercive," but because

-

he was a passenger on a bus that was
scheduled to depart. Id. at 2387.
Because a person traveling on a bus
has no desire to leave, the presence
of the police was not an accurate
measurement ofthe coerciveness of
the encounter. Id.
The Court then cited INS v.
Delgado, 466 U.S. 210 (1984),
which it found to be dispositive of
the issue. In Delgado, the Court
held that a seizure had not occurred
when workers were questioned in
their workplace and were not free to
leave without being questioned. Id.
(citing Delgado, 466 U.S. at 218).
The Court observed that the officers' conduct provided the workers
with no reason to believe that they
would be detained if they refused to
answer any questions. Id. The
Delgado Court emphasized that the
workers' ability to leave was not
restricted by the police officers, but
by voluntary obligations to their
employers. Id.
The Court stated that Bostick's
case was analytically indistinguishable from Delgado. Id. Like the
workers in Delgado, the Court reasoned that Bostick's movement was
restricted by a factor independent of
the police conduct. Id. Therefore,
according to the Court, the "free to
leave" analysis used by the Florida
Supreme Court was not the correct
inquiry. Id. The Court held instead
that the "appropriate inquiry is
whether a reasonable person would
feel free to decline the officers' requests or otherwise terminate the
encounter." Id. The location ofthe
encounter is only one ofthe factors
to be considered in determining
whether a seizure had occurred. Id.
In observing that its opinion is
consistent with prior decisions, the
Court noted that it has previously
stated that ''the crucial test is whether,
taking into account all of the circumstances surrounding the encoun-

ter, the police conduct would 'have
communicated to a reasonable person that he was not at liberty to
ignore the police presence and go
about his business.''' Id. (citing
Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S.
567, 569 (1988». Consequently,
the Court held that it was not per se
unconstitutional for police officers
to board buses and randomly request passengers' consent to search
their luggage. Id. at 2389. In light
of its decision, the Court remanded
the case to the Florida courts to
determine whether a seizure took
place.
Although the Supreme Court
claimed that no new ground was
broken by its decision, it is now
clear that police officers may pursue
drug interdiction efforts on buses.
Prior Court decisions have allowed
police officers to question individuals in such places as the workplace,
in airport lobbies, and on city streets.
The reasoning in Florida v. Bostick
indicates that individuals will no
longer be immune from police questioning in many other public places.
The Court's decision has sent a
message that police may question
individuals anywhere they please so
long as the encounter is not coercive.
- Will Jacobi

Craig v. State: THE COURT OF
APPEALS REDEFINES
WHEN AN ABUSED CHILD
IS CONSIDERED SUFFICIENTL Y UNAVAILABLE TO
TESTIFY AND ALLOWS FOR
THE TAKING OF TESTIMONY BY CLOSED-CIRCUIT
TELEVISION.
In a case of constitutional import, the Court of Appeals of Maryland clarified when it is appropriate
for a trial court judge to order the
testimony ofa child abuse victim to
be taken outside the courtroom
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